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Three separate provisions now govern deposits of money in trust
for another. Sec. 220 (o) of the N. C. Code (1927) merely au-
thorizes the bank upon the death of the trustee to pay the beneficiary.
It does not control as between the beneficiary and the depositor's per-
sonal representative. And it applies only to cases where the benefi-
ciary is a minor above fifteen years of age and where the amount
involved is less than $100.00. It was enacted in 1921 as a revision of
the former law, which limited the amount to $50.00. Sec. 220 (v)
relates to deposits generally in savings banks, and puts them on such
bases as are fixed by the board of directors, as agreed to by the
depositor's acceptance of a passbook. Sec. 5227 relates to savings and
loan associations. It authorizes shares or deposits in trust for
another,' provided the bank is given the name and address of the
beneficiary, and permits withdrawals by the beneficiary or his per-
sonal representative after the death of the trustee. No limitations of
the sort announced in §220 (o), relating either to infancy or max-
imum amount, are here to be found. Apparently no litigation has
gone to the Supreme Court under either section.
It is believed that these statutes should be in effect consolidated
and revised so as to assert a uniform policy both as to commercial or
checking account deposits, savings bank deposits, and building and
loan association deposits, in trust; that the restrictions now in §220
(o) as to infancy and maximum amount should -be eliminated and the
amount left to the regulations of the particular bank or association;
that the statute should not only permit the bank to pay the beneficiary
without the necessity of interpleader or other litigation, but should
control as between the possible claimants; and that it should not pro-
tect the beneficiary if the deposit was for ulterior purposes such as the
evasion of taxation, bank limitations upon amounts of individual
deposits or the like. It is not believed that the New York tentative
* This article has been prepared by the members of the law faculty of the
University of North Carolina, except the discussion of Probation under Crim-
inal Law and Procedure, which was written by W. T. Covington, Jr., of the
Student Board of Editors.
'The first part of the section deals with another matter which should not
be lost sight of in a formal draft of a bill.
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trust doctrine should be adopted here, because that complicates the
proof of a bona fide trust intent. That doctrine permits the trustee
to make withdrawals, leaving the balance for the beneficiary, although
this would seem to make the purpose testamentary in violation of the
Wills Act, but it also permits the use of the fact of withdrawals or
of intention to make withdrawals as evidence of a lack of a bona fide
trust intent.2
Apparently no statute in any other state goes as far as is here
suggested. Most courts, however, require proof in addition to the
form of the deposit of a bona fide trust intent, because of the wide-
spread tendency of bank depositors to use the trust form of deposit
for ulterior purposes. Massachusetts alone makes notice to the ben-
eficiary indispensable.3 No litigation of this sort seems to have arisen
in this state.
It is believed, however, that bank deposits in trust are legitimate
and useful devices. It is hoped that a statute of the sort here con-
templated would insure against litigation of the type that has fre-
quently arisen elsewhere in the absence of definite legislation.
The following is suggested:
"Whenever a deposit has been made in any bank or banking institution,
savings bank or building and loan association, or whenever any share of stock
has been issued in any building and loan association, in trust for any other person
or persons, and no other notice has been given to the bank or association of the
terms of the trust, the bank or association, upon the death of the trustee, may
pay the amount of the deposit or share, together with the accrued interest or
dividends thereon, to the beneficiary designated on the bank's or association's
records. And, unless the evidence other than the form of the deposit or share
establishes the absence of a bona fide trust intent upon the part of the de-
positor or person making application for the share, neither the personal repre-
sentative nor any other person claiming under the depositor or applicant sball
be entitled to the proceeds of the deposit or share as against the beneficiary
designated on the bank's or association's records."
Joint Deposits.
Joint bank deposits in this state are governed by N. C. Code
(1927) §230. While there is some slight reason to believe that the
omission of this section from the 1921 banking act operated to repeal
it, the Supreme Court in 1929 assumed that it was in force.1 It
provides that the bank may safely pay either of the two persons,
'Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1133.
' BoGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 78-91.'Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929).
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whether the other is alive or not, when the deposit is made payable
to either or to either or the survivor. Like §220 (o) it is obviously de-
signed to protect the bank, and does not control as between the per-
sonal representative of the deceased and the other party. While, by its
terms, the statute might apply whether there are words of survivor-
ship in the deposit record or not, the Court, in the case cited, held
that the authority of the survivor to withdraw, where no such words
were used, was revoked by the death of the other person.
It is believed that this section should be revised, so as to eliminate
any doubt as to its being in force; to make it control as between the
estate of the deceased and the survivor in addition to protecting the
bank; so as to make it conform to the Supreme Court decision cited
by becoming applicable only when words of survivorship are used;
and so as to forestall any litigation attempting to invalidate such a
device as being in violation of the Wills Act. No other statute goes
this far.
As to control between the parties, a note in 8 N. C. L. REv. 73
(1929) indicates that while most courts, when survivorship is indi-
cated, have allowed the survivor to take, there is great disagreement
as to the precise basis for so holding, some spelling out a gift,2 some
a trust, some a joint tenancy, others a tenancy by the entirety, and
still others a third party beneficiary contract. If the right were made
definitely statutory, this difficulty would be eliminated and litigation
minimized.
When it has appeared that there was an understanding between
the parties designated as joint depositors to the effect that one was
not to attempt withdrawals until the death of the other, holdings
have not been infrequent that the transaction was testamentary in
character and void for lack of a will.3 Whether the inheritance tax
should apply is another question, seldom raised because usually the
amounts are small, but it is believed that there ought to be a statutory
sanction for the validity of the transaction. Usually the amounts are
small and the joint depositors are either husband and wife or others
in a close family relationship. The purpose is legitimate, to afford
a drawing account in an emergency while both are alive, available to
both, and to provide ready cash at the time of the death of the wage-
earner. Even if the latter purpose alone be the one in mind and
withdrawals by the dependent are forbidden until the death of the
'See Thomas v. Huston, 181 N. C. 91, 106 S. E. 466 (1921).
'Note (1929) 8 N. C. L. Rzv. 73.
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other, the bank records are a safeguard against error, and there is
some reason to believe that action of the bank at the time of the de-
posit might be as effective as that of the witnesses at the formal
execution of a will; indeed, the whole device has sometimes been
called "a poor man's will."
The following, therefore, is suggested:
"Whenever a deposit has been made in any bank or banking institution,
savings bank, or building and loan association, or whenever any share of stock
has been issued by any building and loan association, in the name of two or
more persons, payable to either or the survivor of them, either person desig-
nated may withdraw any part or all of the amount of the deposit or share;
and, after the death of either person the survivor shall be entitled to the
balance of the account, including any accrued interest or dividends, notwith-
standing the fact that the power of the survivor to withdraw any part or all
of the funds in question was postponed until after the death of the other."
Objections to Proposed Bankers' Collection Code.
Nine states enacted in 1929 the Bank Collection Code recom-
mended by the American Bankers Association.' Efforts will be made
to write that Code into the Statutes of North Carolina in 1931. In the
best interests of the people of this State, bankers along with the
others, it is hoped that these efforts will not succeed and that the
matter will be deferred until the next Legislature.
It is fully recognized that most of the special acts sponsored by
the bankers have been useful and desirable ;2 it is recognized more-
over, that the chaotic state of bank collection law the country over3
makes a collection code an urgent necessity and that the proposed
code has the merit of settling many of the confusions by a definite
rule of some sort. Still no act which deals with so large a group of
conflicting interests should be written into law on the sponsorship
alone of one of those interests and the most powerful one at that.
Nor should any such significant bill when drafted by one powerful
interest alone become a law to bind the whole business community
without a most searching scrutiny.
Most of our other far-reaching uniform acts were not so drafted.
The Negotiable Instruments Law and the Warehouse Receipts Act
now serving us usefully were prepared under the direction of the
Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New Jersey, New
York, Washington, and Wisconsin.' See for example those passed in North Carolina during the 1929 session.
7 N. C. L. Rzv. 366.
'Turner, Bank Collections, (1930) 39 YM.n L. J. 468; Townsend, Construc-
tive Trusts and Bank Collections, (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 980.
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Commissioners on Uniform States Laws and were recommended
after extended discussion and consideration of all interests that de-
sired to be heard. The same group representing every state in the
Union and pro nothing are now at work on a collection act for recom-
mendation to a subsequent Legislature.
But the paternity and sponsorship of the present measure are, of
course, no conclusive arguments against its acceptance. It remains,
therefore, to point out certain features of the Act which are believed
to be objectionable.
The general objections are two:
1. That the proposed act fails to include certain important pro-
visions whose absence seems likely to result in litigation. The least
that can be asked of an act intended to put an end to confusion in the
law is that it leave no obvious unsolved difficulties for judicial de-
termination.
2. That it establishes an undesirable rule in certain cases.
Specific instances of these general faults are as follows:
Section 3 makes a credit given 'by a bank to its depositor for an
item drawn on itself subject to revocation at any time during the day
of the deposit. This reverses the usual judicial rule, and wisely so,
being, in fact, exactly what is commonly stipulated on deposit slips
supplied to customers in North Carolina and elsewhere. But no duty
is here placed on the bank to give the depositor prompt notice of the
revocation of his credit or to return the item to him or to give notice
of dishonor to parties secondarily liable. The risk of loss here is on
the depositor 4-and the act fails properly to protect him.5
Section 4 converts into restrictive endorsements the following two
common forms: "For deposit" and "Pay any bank or banker." To
present the arguments against this change adequately would require
an extended discussion. The proposal would settle a present conflict
in this country6 by adopting the poorer view. There is nothing in
the language of these two styles of endorsement to make them re-
strictive in character 7 and both types are frequently used in cases of
'See N. I. L., §89; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §3071.
'By some straining, N. I. L., §94, [N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §3076]
might be made to cover the case but that argument is no justification for the
omission of a definite provision here.
'BIGaELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (3 ed. 1928) 195.
' "For deposit" is a protective endorsement against cashing of checks by
unauthorized persons, and has nothing to do with questions of purchase or
agency. "Pay any bank or banker" is obviously a special endorsement wherein
a class is specified instead of a single person. If it was universally used to
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purchase and sale. If banks desire to receive paper only under re-
strictive endorsements there is nothing to prevent them returning to
the old style of collection endorsement which they themselves repu-
diated and abandoned in 1896.8
Section 7 provides as to mail collections sent direct to a solvent
drawee that they are deemed paid "when the amount is finally charged
to the account of the maker or drawer." Laying aside the promise of
litigation wrapped up in the word "finally," the section has a decep-
tively alluring simplicity. When better to call an item paid it may be
asked than when charged up? And how could it be more definite?
The answer is that for certain purposes-i.e. to take precedence over
garnishments and perhaps over stop orders-the earliest suitable mo-
ment for payment should be selected. An item should at all events be
treated as paid against a garnisheeing creditor of the drawer once
the drawee bank has sent a remittance, whether it has debited the
drawer's account at that moment or not. Hirning v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis recently decided9 is- evidence enough that some-
times at least the remitting and debiting take place in that order.
Whether an alternative time for payment should be fixed and sim-
plicity to some extent be sacrificed is a matter for further study. The
proposed provision should not be accepted.
Section 9 permits a collecting bank to "receive in payment of an
item without becoming responsible as debtor therefor, whether pre-
sented by mail, through the clearing-house or over the counter" the
draft of the drawee of the item presented. The fault of this section
is that it treats altogether and in like fashion presentation by mail,
through a clearing-house and over the counter. Conceding that the
present manner of handling collections is a warrant for a specially
favorable rule in mail presentment cases, since there is no practical
way for a mail collection to be made except by the receipt of an ex-
change draft from the drawee,10 it does not in the least follow that
such special rule should be expanded to include clearing-house and
counter presentments. Settlements there can be made in cash or by
secured credit of some form. The payee ought not to be required to
bear this added burden.
identify collection items we might accept the result of usage but it is not so
universally employed. The best place for a provision of this character is in
the N. I. L.
'First National Bank of Belmont v. First National Bank, 58 Ohio St. 207,
50 N. E. 723 (1898).
042 F. (2d) 925 (D. Minn. 1930).
"Despite occasional judicial remarks about remitting the cash collected,
See Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne, 69 Mont. 140, 220 Pac. 1114 (1923).
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Section 11 allows a collecting ,bank, among other things, to treat
an item as dishonored in case the draft of the drawee bank given in
settlement shall not be paid in due course. This rule applies even
where the account of the drawer of the original item has been debited
and the item returned to him. The effect of this proposed change is
to hold a drawer on a check which has been canceled, charged to him
and returned to him 'because the draft given by his bank to the collect-
ing bank is subsequently dishonored. The hardship of such a rule on
a drawer is mentioned in the opinion of Connor, J., in a recent North
Carolina case involving exactly these facts. 1 While the problem is
one of much doubt it is not 'believed wise at the present time to
change the North Carolina rule so recently established. Possible com-
plications of the proposed change have been heretofore suggested in
this Review and will not now be discussed.'
2
It is true that the Bankers Association in proposing the Code
makes the following concession as to this section: "Should it be found
undesirable in any state to adopt the policy declared in this section the
same can be omitted; and in such event §12 should also be omitted and
also the opening words in paragraph 2 of §13."
But to pass the Act without any provision on this subject would
be to do an inadequate job of codifying the law of bank collections.
We have the choice, then, (1) of passing the Code as proposed and
making an undesired and undesirable change in our law, or (2) of
passing it in a bob-tailed form, leaving to future Legislatures the job
of supplying this needed provision in acceptable form, or (3) of pass-
ing this Code in an amended form. The last would be the most de-
sirable move except for the fact that this complicated and technical
matter deserves the most careful study to avoid results even more
objectionable than those which now face us. Under the circum-
stances it seems infinitely better to await the outcome of the Com-
missioners' action and the proposals which they make.
One final criticism of a general character, however, can be made.
The proposed Collection Code fails to deal with the matter of counter
presentment, clearing-house presentment and mail presentment as
three different matters throughout. There are strong reasons for
treating these three matters independently and the failure to do so can
only produce confusion when the Act comes to be tried out in the
states that have adopted it.
North Carolina should wait.
'See Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 262, 148 S. E. 256, 258 (1929).
"8 N. C. L. REv. 55, 59.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Declaratory judgment.
This is a change in procedure which has caused much discussion
within recent years, coming here from England, and being adopted,
in a more or less modified form, in many states. It is spoken of as
a "Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights,' ..A Needed Procedural
Reform," and "one of the most interesting and important of the
recent developments in the field of judgments."' The courts, in the
exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, render judgments declaring
the rights of the litigants, and give effect to them by appropriate
remedies; but such action is usually taken only with reference to
some actual infringement of a right or some threatened injury thereto.
There is an actual controversy between the parties, which calls for
an immediate settlement. To obtain relief a party must wait until
the opponent has done or threatened some act which will infringe
his right, and then the power of the court is invoked, not only to
declare the rights of the parties, but to give immediate effect to them
through the use of proper process. In most cases, however, the
action stops with the decision of the rights, and the strong arm of
the law is not necessary for their enforcement.
The declaratory judgment is intended to define the rights of the
parties in a particular situation, not with a view to immediate en-
forcement by the court, but in order that the parties may know their
rights and give effect to them by their subsequent conduct. It is a
judgment of the court, final in its nature and operating as res judicata,
but not intended to be followed and enforced by the final process of
the court. The general purpose is shown by the rule adopted in the
English practice, that "no action or proceeding shall be open to ob-
jection, on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order
is sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of
right, whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or
not."
2
In North Carolina, there are certain proceedings which are some-
what declaratory in their nature, but their general purpose is to have
a final judgment, to be enforced by the process of the court. It has
been the policy of the court not to consider anything in the nature of
'Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform
(1918) 28 YALE L. J. 1, 105; Sunderland, A Modern EvoAltion in Remedial
Rights,--The Declaratory Judgment (1917) 16 MicH. L. REV. 69; 3 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §1353.
'ODGERs, PLEADING (9th ed., 1926) 220, 399; Order XXV.
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a "moot question," or "a feigned issue," or a request for advice or
information, which does not involve an actual controversy which
calls for some immediate action.3 In a "controversy without action,"
the parties may agree upon the facts and submit the question of their
rights arising thereon to the court for adjudication; but in this there
must be an actual controversy calling for immediate determination
and action, and nothing can be determined in such proceeding which
could not have been the basis for an ordinary civil action.
4 Civil
actions in the nature of bills" quia timet and to quiet title are regu-
larly used in practice, but in these something more than the declara-
tion of the right is involved, in that the judgment may require some
immediate enforcement.5 An executor or trustee may apply to the
court for advice in the management of the trust, but in such case the
advice of the court is given only upon an existing state of facts which
calls for some present action, and not in regard to future conduct
upon a certain contingency. 6 In proceedings under the Torrens
Acts,7 the relief is somewhat in the nature of a declaratory judgment,
in settling the title to land, but this is also in the nature of an action
to quiet title.
In some instances the Supreme Court has been called upon to
express an opinion as to the legal effect of certain proposed action
on the part of the legislative or executive departments; but when
this is done, it is not in any sense a judgment binding upon the court
or any parties. It is only an advisory opinion upon a particular
question. The Supreme Court may also, in its discretion, render an
advisory opinion in a case coming before it on appeal, where if is not
so presented as to allow of a final judgment, but the question of law
presented is important. The only judgment rendered is one dismiss-
ing the case, but the court expresses an opinion upon the question
involved as advisory, virtually deciding the question and preventing
any further litigation.8 This is, in effect, the meaning of the declar-
atory judgment. The parties ask the court to make a declaration as
to their rights, and they are to be governed by that declaration as a
'Kistler v. R. RL, 164 N. C. 365, 79 S. E. 676 (1913) ; s. c. 170 N. C. 666, 79
S. E. 676 (1915).
'N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927) §266; Waters v. Boyd, 179 N. C. 180, 102
S. E. 196 (1920).
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §1743; McINosH, N. C. PRAc. AND PROC.
(1930) p. 1110.
'Little v. Thorne, 93 N. C. 69 (1885).
" N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §2377 et seq.
'Farthing v. Carrington, 116 N. C. 315, 22 S. E. 9 (1895).
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judgment, whether it involves consequential relief, or is intended to
regulate their future action.
The sentiment in favor of such practice has grown in favor so
much that it has called for the preparation of a uniform act. The
first form suggested was very brief, following the English practice.
The second suggested in 1922 is more elaborate and is given in full
below. In the case of Anway v. Grand Rapids R. Co.,10 the Michi-
gan court held that the act was unconstitutional, in that it imposed
upon the courts the performance of non-judicial duties, and made
them "the legal advisers of everybody." The decision seems to have
been based upon the idea that no actual controversy was involved or
required, and,that no consequential relief could be given. In a more
recent Michigan case, after a change had been made in the wording
of the statute, it was sustained. The changes made provided that the
act should apply only to "cases of actual controversies," and also that
the "declaration of rights . . . shall have the effect of a final judg-
ment." The court says, "This act does not constitute the court a
fountain of legal advice to fill the cups of loitering wayfarers." It
also points out clearly the nature of the cases to which it will apply.1 1
UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT12
1. SCOPE. Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to
objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declarations shall have the force and effect of a fnal judgment or decree.
2. POWER TO CONSTRUE, ETC. Any person interested under a deed,
will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
3. BEFORE BREACH. A contract may be construed either before or
after there has been a breach thereof.
'McIntosh, Suggested Changes in NT. C. Civil Procedure (1929) 7 N. C. L.
Rv. 168.
'0211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350, 12 A. L. R. 26 (1920).
11 Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 229 N. W. 618 (Mich., 1930).
See also State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82, 19 A. L. R.
1116 (1921) ; De Charette v. St. Matthews Bank, 214 Ky. 400, 283 S. W. 410, 50
A. L. R. 42 (1926) ; see also discussion in CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 230
and references given.
' 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 87.
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4. EXECUTOR, ETC. Any person interested as or through an executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee,
heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of
the estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may have a declaration
of rights or legal relations in respect thereto: (a) To ascertain any class of
creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or (b) -To direct the
executors, administrators, or trustees to do or abstain from doing any partic-
ular act in their fiduciary capacity; or, (c) To determine any question arising
in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction
of wills and other writings.
5. ENUMERATION NOT EXCLUSIVE. The enumeration in Sections 2,
3 and 4 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred
in Section 1, in any proceedings where declaratory relief is sought, in which a
judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
6. DISCRETIONARY. The court may refuse to render or enter a declar-
atory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or
entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
proceeding.
7. REVIEW. All orders, judgments and decrees under this act may be
reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.
8. SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF. Further relief based on a declaratory
judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The ap-
plication therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant
the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable
notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by thet
declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be
granted forthwith.
9. JURY TRIAL. When a proceeding under this Act involves the de-
termination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the
same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in
the court in which the proceeding is pending.
10. COSTS. In any proceeding under this act the court may make such
award of costs as may seem equitable and just.
11. PARTIES. When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be
made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties
to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a munic-
ipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall
be entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to
be unconstitutional, the Attorney-General of the State shall also be served with
a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
12. CONSTRUCTION. This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is
to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and
administered.
13. WORDS CONSTRUED. The word "'person" wherever used in this
act, shall be construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock company,
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unincorporated association, or society, or municipal or other corporation of any
character whatsoever.
14. PROVISIONS SEVERABLE. The several sections and provisions of
this act except sections 1 and 2, axe hereby declared independent and severable,
and the invalidity, if any, of any part or feature thereof shall not affect or
render the remainder of the act invalid or inoperative.
15. UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION. This act shall be so in-
terpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law of those States which enact it, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with
federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and
decrees.
16. SHORT TITLE. This act may be cited as the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act.
17. TIME OF TAKING EFFECT. This act shall take effect from and
after its ratification.
Alternative pleading.
The Code requires that the complaint shall contain a plain and
concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, and
this is generally held to exclude pleading in the alternative. While
this may not be such a defect as to render the pleading subject to
demurrer, it may be the basis of a motion to make it more definite
and certain. 13 In some jurisdictions such a form of pleading has
been recognized either by statute or by judicial construction, and is
considered an advantage rather than a defect.' 4 Such alternative
statement may apply to the plaintiffs or defendants, or to the causes
of action.
As to the plaintiffs, the Code provides that "all persons having an
interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief de-
manded may be joined as plaintiffs."'1 5 While this does not require
identity of interest in the plaintiffs, there could not be a conflict of
interests. A broader rule is found in the statute which provides that
all persons may be joined as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief
arising out of the transaction exists, "whether jointly, severally or
in the alternative," where any common question of law or fact would
arise.16  As an illustration, this might have the effect of an inter-
pleader, where two persons make the same demand upon the de-
Daniels v. Baxter, 120 N. C. 14, 26 S. E. 635 (1897).
"Hankin, Altertative and Hypothetical Pleadings (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
365; CLARK op. cit. supra note 11, at 171.
N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §455.
'NEW YORK Civ. PRAc. Acr §209; English Rules, Order XVI.
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fendant, and one or the other is entitled to recover, and would be
simpler and shorter than the present interpleader.1
7
As to the defendants, the Code rule is, that any person may be
made a defendant who has, or claims, an interest in the controversy
adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to a complete
determination or settlement of the question involved ;18 and this has
been enlarged in some jurisdictions so as to allow the joinder as
defendants all persons "against whom the right to any relief is al-
leged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative";19
and by an additional provision that when the plaintiff is in doubt as to
the persons from whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or
more defendants, to determine which is liable.20 The only remedy
under the existing statute is to sue the defendant who is supposed to
be liable,2 1 or to join all as jointly liable.
22
As to the causes of action, an alternative statement of facts con-
stituting different causes of action might lead to uncertainty and
confusion where there is any conflict, but the same thing may be
done by a separate statement of the two causes, requiring an election
where they are inconsistent. A simple alternative statement should
not, and probably would not, be a defect, where enough appears to
show the defendant what he is called upon to answer.
The following changes in the existing statutes would carry out
the suggestions above presented: Amend sections 455 and 456 of
Consolidated Statutes to read-
"455. WHO MAY BE PLAINTIFFS. All persons having an interest in
the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be joined as
plaintiffs, either jointly, severally, or in the alternative, except as otherwise
provided. If, upon the application of any party, it shall appear that such
joinder may embarrass or delay the trial, the court may order separate trials
or make such other order as may be expedient.
456. WHO MAY BE DEFENDANTS. All persons may be made defend-
ants, jointly, severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim, an interest in
the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties to a com-
plete determination or settlement of the questions involved. In an action to
recover the possession of real estate, the landlord and tenant may be joined as
defendants. Any person claiming title or right of possession to real estate
I N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §460.
"Ibid., §456.
" NEW YORK C(v. PRAC. Acr, §211; English Rules, Order XVI.
"NEw YORK CIV. PRAc. AcT, §213; English Rules, Order XVI; CLARK, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 273; (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 365.
' Meredith v. R. R., 137 N. C. 478, 50 S. E. 1 (1905).
'Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928).
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may be made a party plaintiff or defendant, as the case requires, to such
action. " I
Return of the summons.
Under the present statute, the officer to whom the summons is
directed is required to serve it within ten days after the date of its
issue, and if not served within ten days, it must be returned to the
clerk with the reasons for want of service.23 It may be implied that
the return is to be made within ten days in all cases, but the statute
does not so provide. 24 Under former statutes, when the summons
was returnable before the clerk, either a definite return day was
named, 25 or, as under the original Code, the officer was required to
serve it within ten days after delivery to him, and when executed
he should immediately return it to the court with the date and man-
ner of its execution. 26 It may be that in issuing the summons the
clerks insert an order to the officer to make return within ten days,
or the officer makes the return within that time, but the statute
should be clear enough to avoid doubt. The officer is required to
make return within the time specified, his process bond is liable for
his failure to make a proper return, and he is liable to a penalty for
the neglect.2 7 It may also be important for the plaintiff to know the
date of service as soon as possible, so that he may know when an
answer is to be filed or when he may take judgment by default.
The change suggested in the statute could be made as follows:
That chapter 66, §1, of the Public Laws of 1927, amending §476
of the Consolidated Statutes, be amended by striking out in lines 24
to 28, the words "if not served within ten days after the date of its
issue upon every defendant, must be returned by the officer holding
the same for service, to the clerk of the court issuing the sum-
mons, with notation thereon of its non-service and the reasons there-
for as to every defendant not served," and inserting instead thereof
the following:
"the summons must be returned by the officer holding the same for service, to
the clerk of the court issuing it, with a notation thereon of the service, or tho
non-service, on each defendant, with the reasons for not serving."
' N. C. PuB. LAWS (1927) c. 66.
' Neely v. Minus, 196 N. C. 345, 145 S. E. 771 (1928).
' N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §476.
SBAT-Ei's RE ISAL (1873), p. 159, §75.
' N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§479, 3930, 3936.
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In view of the various changes which have been made in regard
to issuing and service of summons, the time to file complaint and
answer, the service of the pleading, and other changes, affecting dif-
ferent sections of the Consolidated Statutes, it would be an advan-
tage to have the amended sections re-written, so as to preserve the
original numbering and to bring the different subjects within the
proper section numbers.
Publicatiot of summons.
The statute requires that the order for publication shall direct the
publication of a notice for four weeks, giving the title and purpose
of the action, "and requiring the defendant to appear and answer
or demur to the complaint at a time and place therein mentioned" ;28
"service by publication shall be completed within fifty days from the
commencement of the action" ;29 "the summons is deemed served at
the expiration of the time prescribed by the order of publication, and
the party is then in court." 30 Should the order fix a definite day on
which the defendant is "in court," provided the publication has been
made for four weeks, or is the defendant "in court" at the expiration
of the four weeks publication, provided it is within fifty days from
the commencement of the action? In what sense is the defendant
"in court" in either case? Must he appear and answer on the day
mentioned, or is he allowed thirty days thereafter in a civil action
and ten days in a special proceeding? Since in most cases of publica-
tion there is no answer filed, the plaintiff should know when he is
entitled to have a judgment. It may be that the practice in this re-
spect is so well fixed by custom as not to give rise to any question,
but the statute leaves it open to doubt, in view of the recent changes
made in the summons.
It is suggested that the following change be made in the statute:
That 1488 of Consolidated Statutes be amended by inserting
immediately before the last sentence in said section fixing the cost of
advertising, the sentence
"The defendant shall be required to appear and answer on the day named
in such order, and not within thirty days after the service by publication is
completed.''
"Ibid., §485.
' N. C. Pun. LAWS (1927) cc. 66, 132.
' N. C. ANN. CDE (Michie, 1927) §487.
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Warrant of attachment.
There seems to be more uncertainty as to the proper practice in
attachment proceedings than in almost any other part of procedure,
but since a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient, a
mistake in the form is not so material. 8 ' The warrant of attach-
ment may be issued at the same time as the summons, or at any time
thereafter,3 2 and when publication is to be made, the application and
order for publication may take the place of the summons.83 When
the summons was returnable at term and all the proceedings were to
be heard by the judge, the warrant of attachment was to be made
"returnable in term time to the court from which the summons is-
sued."13 4 When, by the act of 1919, the summons was again made
returnable before the clerk, the statute regulating the attachment was
left unchanged, so that the warrant was still returnable at term. By
a later statute this was changed so as to require the warrant to be
made returnable before the clerk at the same time and place to which
the summons is returnable.3 5 When this change was made, the sum-
mons was returnable before the clerk on a day certain, not less than
ten nor more than twenty days from the date of issuing.30  By the
act of 1927, the summons has no definite return day, except by im-
plication, and the statute requires that the warrant must state "when
and where it shall be returned."
37
The purpose of the summons is to give the defendant notice that
an action has been brought, so that he may appear and defend within
the specified time after service; the warrant of attachment is in the
nature of a preliminary execution to be levied upon the property of
the defendant, and no notice of such levy is to be given to the de-
fendant, when there is personal service of the summons. When
service is to be made by publication, notice of the attachment is also
to be given. When should the warrant be made returnable, if it is
issued with the summons, if it is issued after the summons, or if
there be publication and no summons? The meaning of the statute
is not clear, and as it is a question of process, it should not be left in
doubt. It would seem to be more satisfactory to have the warrant
"Page v. McDonald, 159 N. C. 38, 74 S. E. 642 (1912).
"N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §802.
"Grocery Co. v. Bag Co., 142 N. C. 174, 74 S. E. 642 (1906).
"N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §801.
" N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) §801, amended by N. C. PUB. LAWS
(1920) c. 96, §10; N. C. PuB. LAws, (Ex. Sess. 1921) c. 92, §17.
" N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §476.
7 Ibid., §805.
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returnable before the clerk on a definite day or within a certain time,
giving a sufficient time for service. The officer would then know
what he is to do, and the parties would know what to expect or what
had been done.
The change could be made as follows:
That §801 of Consolidated Statutes, as amended by the Public
Laws of 1920, chapter 96, §10, and Extra Session 1921, chapter 92,
§17, be amended as follows: At the end of said section, strike out
the words "returnable before the clerk at the same time and place
to which the summons is returnable," and insert instead thereof the
words
" 'returnable before the clerk issuing the same on a day named therein, not less
than ten nor more than twenty days from the date of issuing."
Garnishwnt.
In garnishment proceedings under attachment, the original Code
required the officer to leave a certified copy of the warrant with the
garnishee, who should then give a certificate of property in his hands
belonging to the defendant; and when he refused to give such in-
formation, he was required to appear before the "court or judge" to
be examined on oath.38 When it was held by the Supreme Court
that no judgment could be given against the garnishee for dny amount
found in his hands, except in a separate action to be brought by the
sheriff or by the plaintiff,3 9 the statutes regulating the practice before
the Code were brought forward, and under these a judgment may be
given against the garnishee, upon notice, as incidental to the main
action.
40
Upon the service of the copy of the attachment upon the garnishee,
the officer is required to summon the garnishee to appear before the
court. This summons is to be issued by the clerk, or justice of the
peace in a proper case, requiring the garnishee "to appear at the court
to which the attachment is returnable, or if issued by a justice of the
peace, at a place and time named in the notice, not exceeding twenty
days from the date of the notice, to answer upon oath what he owes
to the defendant." 4 ' Upon his appearance and examination in the
"BATTLE's RavisAL (1873) p. 187, §§206-208; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie,
1927) §§816-818.
' Carmer v. Evers, 80 N. C. 56 (1879) ; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927)
§§807, 825.
"N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§819-823; Baker v. Belvin, 122 N. C. 190,
30 S. E. 337 (1898).
' Ibid., §819.
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Superior Court, judgment may be entered against the garnishee for
any property found in his hands, and if issue is joined, it is to be
tried by the jury as in other cases."' 42 The garnishee is required to
"appear at the court to which the attachment is returnable." What
is the effect of this provision, construed with reference to the changes
made in regard to the attachment? By the strict wording of the
statute, it seems that this summons or notice is to be returnable at
term, while the attachment is returnable before the clerk; but if the
change also applies to such summons, it does not appear when it
should be made returnable. If the clerk can render judgment by de-
fault against the defendant, upon personal service or publication,
and the warrant of attachment is returnable before him, there would
seem to be no reason why he should not also hear the garnishee,
when property is admitted, or send the case up for trial when issues
are joined. The practice should be uniform and should be clearly
defined.
This change could be made by amending Consolidated Statutes,
§819. That the second sentence in said section, beginning in the
fourth line and ending in the eleventh line, be amended to read as
follows:
"The summons and notice shall be issued by the clerk of the superior
court, or justice of the peace, at the request of the plaintiff; it shall requiro
the garnishee to appear before the clerk of the superior court issuing the at-
tachment, at a time and place named therein, not less than ten nor more than
twenty days from the issuing of the notice, or if issued by a justice of tho
peace, at a time and place mentioned, not exceeding twenty days from the date
of issuing, to answer upon oath what he owes to the defendant and what prop-
erty of the defendant he has in his hands and had at the time of serving the
attachment, and to his knowledge and belief what effects or debts of the de-
fendant there are in the hands of any other, and what person."
At the end of said section add the following:
"The clerk of the superior court issuing the warrant of attachment is
authorized to hear the statement of the garnishee, and to render judgment
thereon, as provided by this and the four succeeding sections, unless issues are
joined. When issues are joined, he shall docket the case for trial at the next
term of the superior court.''
CONTRACTS
Payment of Less as Discharge of a Debt.
It is suggested that N. C. Code (1927) §895 be revised so as to
read as follows:
-Ibid., §§819-823.
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"In all cases of debts, whether liquidated or not, or disputed or not, pay-
ment and acceptance, before or after maturity, of a less sum than that claimed
to be due, shall have the effect of discharging the debt, when that payment has
been made and accepted pursuant to an agreement to that effect."
This statute, if enacted, would not change the present law respect-
ing the discharge of either disputed or unliquidated debts. For, ac-
cording to our decisions, in such cases partial payment furnishes
ample consideration for the promise to forego the balance. But it
would change the present law, as embodied in the decisions of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina since 1915, as to the acceptance
of less in discharge of the whole in cases of liquidated but undisputed
debts.' These decisions, which began at a time when the Court had
the common-law rule as to consideration more in mind than the pro-
visions of the statute (enacted in 1875), and which have since been
based in part upon the phrase "in compromise of the whole" as found
in that statute, have twisted, it is submitted, the statute's clear pur-
pose. That purpose was to overcome the commercial inexpediency of
a particular application of the common-law rule that the doing of
what a person was already under an obligation to do, namely, paying
part of a liquidated and undisputed debt, could not be consideration
for a promise to forego the balance. The suggested revision would
more clearly comply with that original purpose. No rule of property
has been built upon the decisions referred to. Indeed, as the amount of
litigation under the present statute indicates, 'business men have never
fully adjusted themselves to the construction of the statute announced
by the Court. The substance of the suggested revision2 is found in
the statutes of a number of states, including Georgia, 3 Maine,4 and
Virginia.3
Seals.
The following new statute is suggested:
"No sealed instrument, other than deeds to real property, shall be invalid
by reason of the fact that the authority of any person to sign the instrument or
to fill up blanks therein was not itself conferred by an instrument under seal."
There have been a number of cases in this state where the maker
of a note under seal escaped liability because when he delivered it,
'Note (1929) 8 N. C. L. REV. 71.For other types of statutes see 1 WimLsIroN, CONTRACTS (1919) §120,
note 47.
'GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §4329.
" ME. REv. STATS. (1916) c. 87, §63.
"VA. CODE ANN. (1924) §5765.
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blanks were left for the name of the obligee or of the amount, or
both, which were later filled up by an authorized person, whose
authority was not under seal. It was pointed out by Judge Rodman,
in 1874,1 that this line of cases resulted from the treatment of these
bonds as instruments under seal rather than as commercial paper,
and that the decisions were perhaps unwise from a business point of
view. He suggested that a change should come from the legislature.
Apparently, the legislature has made no change. The three provis-
ions of the Negotiable Instruments Law which come nearest do not
affect the question. One, N. C. Code (1927) §2987, merely pro-
vides that the validity and negotiability of an instrument are not
affected by the fact that it is under seal. Another, §2995, is not con-
cerned with instruments under seal, when it deals with what consti-
tutes prima facie authority to fill blanks and with the necessity of
compliance with that authority. Similarly, §3000, when it requires
no particular form of authority of an agent to sign an instrument,
is not concerned with instruments under seal.
It is believed that the statute proposed would come within the
policy of these provisions of the N. I. L. and of §988 (the Statute of
Frauds), in that, while leaving the requirement of authority as it
stood formerly, it merely eliminates the today wholly formal require-
ment of a seal. And it will be noticed that neither of the provisions
just mentioned requires the authority to be in writing. However
debatable that lack might be as an original question, we have appar-
ently permitted the authority to rest in parol both under the Statute
of Frauds and the N. I. L. and it is not now proposed to change that.
It is believed, also, that it would be unwise to extend the proposed
change to deeds of land.
COURTS
Rue -anaking Power.
The Judicial Conference of North Carolina-composed of the
judges of the Supreme and Superior Courts, the attorney general,
and a practicing attorney from each judicial district-has twice
recommended to the legislature that the Supreme Court be given
the rule-making power, but so far the legislature has turned a deaf
ear to this recommendation. The matter seems to be of sufficient
importance to be worthy again of the General Assembly's serious
'Barden v. Southerland, 70 N. C. 528 (1874).
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consideration, and the following statute, similar to that proposed by
the Judicial Conference except for one clause, is herewith submitted:
"The Supreme Court of North Carolina is hereby given the power to pre-
scribe by General Rules for the Superior Courts and Inferior Courts of the
state, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and
procedure in all actions; and the said Supreme Court is hereby empowered to
appoint an advisory body from the bench and bar of the State to make sug-
gestions and recommendations to, and in any way assist, the Supreme Court in
formulating the said rules of practice and procedure; and the said rules shall
not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant; nor
shall the said rules take effect until six months after their promulgation."
The legislature has already gone part of the way and recognized
the fact that the Supreme Court-the judiciary itself-is the logical
depository of the power to make rules for the proper functioning of
the state's judicial system. By the Constitution of 1868 the Su-
preme Court was given the exclusive power to prescribe the rules of
practice for that court; but the power to regulate the methods of
proceeding in all the courts below the Supreme Court was given to
the legislature. The latter body, however, by statutory enactment
has relinquished this power to the Supreme Court to the extent that
the court may prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the
lower courts where the legislature has failed to do so; and such rules
are, at present, subject to legislative modification.
That the complete rule-making power should be given to the
Supreme Court needs but little argument. There can be no doubt
but that a much smoother and more uniform code of practice and
procedure would result from rules formulated by experienced judges
than from hastily drawn and often ill-advised statutes passed by a
body of laymen busily engaged for a sixty-day period in enacting
laws of every class and description. The legislature is constantly
tinkering with and patching up the Code of Civil Procedure. A
statute is passed to remedy a certain evil, but the legislature often
fails to take serious thought as to what effect the change will have
upon the proper functioning and cobrdination of the procedural
program as a whole. The mistakes made by the 1927 legislature in
connection with the return of the summons resulted in a two year
period of confusion and uncertainty in the law until some corrections
were made by statutory enactments of the 1929 Assembly. The
Supreme Court, if it should make a mistake in formulating a rule
of practice or procedure, could at least make an immediate correction
thereof.
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Probation.
During the years 1922 through 1928, 8,731 offenders or 23.69
per cent of those convicted in the Superior Courts of violating the
criminal law were granted suspended sentences.1 The implications
of this fact lead to the inescapable conclusion that the North Caro-
lina courts, while actively aware of the advantages of probation, are
prevented from accomplishing its ends by the lack of an adequate
probation law.
I
The power to suspend sentence at common law was limited to
postponing the execution of the penalty for a definite purpose, as to
allow the prisoner to apply for a pardon,2 but in this state the prac-
tice is to suspend sentence indefinitely with the avowed intention of
.lever exacting the Prescribed punishment, if certain conditions are
met by the convicted.3 The power thus exercised by the North
Carolina courts, though open to the attack of having been usurped
from the executive department of the government, 4 is well established
and is not likely to be disturbed at this late date for the uncertain
advantage of historical accuracy. In spite of the fact that the power
in the courts to suspend sentence indefinitely did not exist in Eng-
land, it might be argued with some force that it has attained a posi-
tion of security as a part of the common law of North Carolina in
the same manner as the doctrine of the benefit of clergy developed,
that is, through long and uncontested judicial usage.5
The modern practice of suspending sentence has grown up to
meet the inadequacy of the criminal law. Human conduct does not
lend itself to mathematical calculations, and differing individualities
and varying environments make impersonal justice idle talk. Few
judges would be content to administer mechanically the statutory
'From statistics in the files of the Institute for Research in Social Science,
University of North Carolina.
'2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 412; 4 BL. COMM., 394-395; Ex parte
United States, Petitioner, 242 U. S. 27, 37 Sup. Ct. 72, 61 L. ed. 129 (1916).
'State v. McAffee, 189 N. C. 320, 127 S. E. 204 (1925). For a collection of
North Carolina cases illustrating the practice of suspending sentence see
(1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 116; (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 327; (1930) 8 N. C. L.
REv. 465.
'Bruce, The Power to Suspend a Criminal Sentence for an Indefinite Period
or During Good Behavior (1922) 6 MINN. L. REV. 363, 368.
'This argument is advanced in support of the Massachusetts practice of
"laying a case on file." Grinnell, Probation as a Common Law Practice in
Massachusetts Prior to the Statutory System (1917) 2 MASS. L. Q. 591, 614.
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penalties for crime and the Killits Case, 6 which thrust this burden
on the federal judges, who the Supreme Court held had been e -
ercising the power to suspend sentence without authority, was the
precursor of the Federal Probation Act,1 which expressly grants the
power to suspend sentence to the federal courts.
As North Carolina now recognizes the power, it is hardly con-
ceivable that a codifying statute would be attacked on the ground of
unconstitutionality. In any event, the only objection that has been
advanced against the constitutionality of such a statute, that under
our divisional government the only clemency possible is from the
executive,8 is conclusively met by the fact that the legislature has
the power to prescribe the treatment for crime.9
II
An act 10 passed in 1919 provided for probation in the county
juvenile courts, but in the majority of the counties there is no actual
probation work done, due to the fact that the nominal officers of the
juvenile courts are men who have had the juvenile court duties added
to those of other responsible positions, which take up most of their
thought and effort. The juvenile court officers, with the exception of
the public welfare officers, are not chosen because of their fitness for
the work, but because they happen to hold certain political office.
The judge is usually the Clerk of the Superior Court and the proba-
tion officer either the Public Welfare Officer or the Superintendent
of Public Instruction." But this system, whatever its vices or vir-
tues, since it extends only to the juvenile courts, does not affect the
bulk of the state's offenders.
A Superior Court judge who today faces the duty of imposing a
sentence or fine or imprisonment may do one of two things. He
may decree either that the sentence be immediately executed or that
the sentence be suspended. The suspended sentence operates to re-
lease the prisoner subject to a later execution of the sentence in the
'Ex parte United States, Petitioner, supra note 2.
'43 STAT. 1259 (1925), 18 U. S. C. A. §§724-727 (1927).
'Kerr, Judicial Parole Against Sound Public Policy (1921) 55 Am. L. REv.
512, 515.
Bruce, op. cit. supra note 4, at 374.
=O N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§5049-5051.
' In 69 counties the judge of the juvenile court is the Clerk of the Superior
Court, in 27 the only probation officer is the Supt. of Public Welfare, and in
35 the only probation officer is the Supt. of Public Instruction. REPORT OF
JUVENILE COURT COMMITTEE OF NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE FOR SOCIAL
SERVICE (1930).
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discretion of the court, which is in effect to let him go scot-free.
Thus the alternatives become a dilemma, where the judge believes
that the execution of the penalty would be unjust. The suspended
sentence may sometimes be the lesser of two evils, but that it is a
real evil may be seen by a reference to its results.
III
The suspended sentence as a treatment of crime falls down in
two essential respects. It fails (1) to afford any adequate protection
to society and (2) to take active steps to reform the individual. Due
to the court's present organization the judge must decide in each case
whether the sentence shall be suspended from data brought out at
the trial. This information as regards the defendant's history, 'hab-
its, disposition and surroundings is both meagre and partisan and
the selection bf offenders to be released under the suspended sentence
with this information as a basis exposes the community to a two-
fold danger. First, an offender unsuited to this treatment may be
sent back to the community to inflict further injuries and, second,
one who, if sent back to his own community, would have become a
law abiding citizen, may be sent 'to prison to become a confirmed
criminal through the degenerating experience of incarceration.' 2
The court having suspended sentence has to all practical effects
lost control of the offender and he takes his place in the community
as though nothing had happened. Not only are there no affirmative
efforts made to rehabilitate him, but the so-called sword of Damocles
is somewhat illusory. The threat that, if the conditions on which
the sentence was suspended are broken, the sentence will be imme-
diately executed seems idle in view of the facts that there is nothing
to prevent the offender from leaving the community where the con-
ditions are known and that, if he chooses to remain, there are no
means available by which the court can keep in closer touch with
him than with any other member of the community. For example,
when sentence is suspended on the usual condition of good behavior,
which is interpreted to mean mere compliance with the law,13 the
most the court can do is to require the offender to appear at succes-
sive terms and show that he has been good. He will readily testify
"A sentence served in common confinement means that a criminal is pun-
ished for his offense by being further instructed in crime at the state's ex-
pense." Krone as quoted in ASCHAFFENBURG, CRIME AND ITs RURESSION
(1913) 282.
"State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922).
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to that effect and, if no notice that the offender has violated the law
is brought to the court's attention, the matter is ended and the of-
fender dismissed. There are no known limits to the power of the
court to impose other conditions,1 4 but there is similarly no way to
enforce them and they would hardly have better effect.
Thus the suspended sentence is seen to retain the limitations of
its origin. Having developed as a means of postponing the penalty,
where the offender's conduct in the meantime was not important
(since the penalty was sure to be finally inflicted), it has not ex-
panded to meet the use to which it is now put as a part of or a sub-
stitute for the penalty itself imposed with the hope that the offender
will reform during the period of suspension and that the penalty
will never be invoked.
IV
Probation 15 does much to cure the principal defects of the sus-
pended sentence, which have been seen to be (1) an adequate method
of determining whether in the individual case sentence should be
suspended and (2) inefficient means of enforcing the conditions on
which the suspension is granted. The curative prescribed for these
defects is the work of the probation officer, which consists, first, in
making an investigation of the past life of the offender before sen-
tence is suspended and, second, in keeping in touch with the offender
after he is thus released, by requiring him to report and by paying
him visits at varying intervals.
The system, however, undertakes to go further than to remedy
the faults of the suspended sentence. It undertakes actively to help
the offender to bring about his reformation and, since the reformation
is attempted in the natural environment of the offender, the social
forces thus brought into play (which may include all the agencies
for social welfare in the community) have a broader influence than
they could have had in the unnatural environment of the prison.
"' Sentences have been suspended on condition that the prisoner leave the
county and never return. Ex parte Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 72 S. E. 310, 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 352 (1911); that he pay the costs, State v. Griffis, 117 N. C.
709, 23 S. E. 164 (1895) ; that he pay the cost for himself and another, State
v. Crook, 115 N. C. 760, 20 S. E. 513, 29 L. R. A. 260 (1894) ; that he keep
the peace and not libel certain persons, State v. Saunders, 153 N. C. 624, 69
S. E. 272 (1910) ; that he show compliance with the prohibition laws for two
years, State v. Greer, 173 N. C. 759, 92 S. E. 147 (1917).
"Good discussions of probation are found in the following treaties: SuTH-
ERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY (1924) c. 23; GILLIN, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY
(1926) cc. 34, 35; COOLEY, PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY (1927); HAYNES,
CRIMINOLOGY (1930) c. 15.
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It affords the courts an improved method of dealing with two
common situations, namely, where an offender is unable to pay a
small fine, and where one is convicted of non-support. In the for-
mer case the offender is permitted to pay the fine in installments,
and in the latter is permitted to pay a weekly sum for the mainte-
nance of his family.
Finally, probation has proven to be less expensive than imprison-
ment. "In New York the current cost of imprisonment is 16 times
as much as probation per offender dealt with under each system and
in Massachusetts 20 times as much."'16
V
The objections to probation are of two sorts, either against the
theory of suspending sentence, which have been considered, or against
its administration. The latter sort of objection is not an attack on the
system, as such, but against the faulty way it is sometimes put into
effect. It emphasizes the responsibility of the state in providing
sufficient funds to employ capable probation officers, and their re-
sponsibility in the careful performance of their duties. The success
of probation depends on the efficiency of the probation officer. If
he fails, the system loses its positive virtues, reverts to its ancestor,
the suspended sentence, and resumes its weaknesses.
The courts, moved by the idea of individual justice, have gone as
far as they can in the development of the suspended sentence. In
view of this fact, together with the weaknesses of the suspended sen-
tence and the advantages of probation, it seems that the next step is
for the General Assembly to enact an adult probation law.
EvIDENCE
North Carolina has within recent years adopted at least two en-
lightened improvements on common law rules of evidence. These
are the act which permits the admission in evidence in death-injury
cases of dying declarations of the deceased,1 and the act passed in
19132 which permits the use of writings as standards of comparison
in disputed handwriting cases whenever such writings are found to
"' SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 15, at 585.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §160 as amended by PuB. LAWS (1919)
c. 29.
2 Ibid., §1784.
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be genuine by the judge. Each of these statutes was a small but
worthwhile step in the direction of liberalizing the traditional rules
as to the admissibility of testimony. The courts and the profession
would welcome further constructive legislation widening the doors
of admissibility to relevant evidence and strengthening the power of
the trial judge to see that the facts are presented fully and expedi-
tiously. The following legislative changes in the rules of evidence
are recommended.
Jttdicial Notice.
Nothing is more time-consuming and useless than the trial, under
the present rules, of a disputed question of the law of a sister state.
In addition to the statutes and decisions of the other state, the depo-
sition of a lawyer from the foreign jurisdiction as to his opinion of
the applicable legal rules must often be had, and if two foreign law-
yers take opposite sides on the question, the jury must decide the
dispute. 3 It seems obvious that this should be a matter for judicial
notice, like questions of domestic law, and that the jury are far more
incapable of deciding disputed questions of foreign law than ques-
tions of local law. Obviously, to answer the question, what is the law,
is to answer a question of fact, whether the law inquired about be
foreign or domestic, but each is a fact which the judge is equipped
to ascertain and the jury is not.4 Moreover, the judge should be
empowered to ascertain the foreign law without any restrictions on
his sources of information and without any formal proof of statutes,
decisions, or, expert opinions. All of these can conveniently and
without expense be placed before him informally just as is done in
the ascertainment of domestic laws. At least five states 5 have ap-
plied common sense to this problem by enacting statutes which enable
the judge to take judicial notice of foreign law. A recent example
is an act passed in Massachusetts6 in 1926 which covers the matter
in the following brief and simple provision:
'Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co., 168 N. C. 382, 84 S. E. 519
(1915). Compare Keesler v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 177 N. C.
394, 99 S. E. 97 (1919) ; In re Estate of Pruden, 196 N. C. 69, 144 S. E. 533
(1928).
'5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §§2558, 2573.
"ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §4110; CONN. GEN. STAT.
(1918) §§5725, 5726, 5727; MICH. ComeP. LAws (Cahill, 1915) §§12513, 12515;
Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) §771; MAss. AcTs 1926, c. 168; W. VA.
CODE. ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 13, §4.
'Mass. Acts 1926, c. 168.
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"The courts shall take judicial notice of the law of the United States or
of any state, territory, or dependency thereof or of a foreign country whenever
the same shall be material."
Husband and Wife as Witnesses Against Each Other.
Formerly the spouses were incompetent to testify for each other,
and were not compellable to testify against each other in civil or
criminal cases. Where one is in possession of material facts, no one
in the ordinary affairs of life would refuse to listen because the per-
son happened to be the husband or wife of an interested party, and
this is so obvious that the rules which bar the evidence of husband or
wife have been abrogated almost entirely in the courthouse also. The
only important remnant of the common law exclusion of spouses as
witnesses is this: in criminal cases, where a husband or wife is on
trial, the other spouse is neither competent nor compellable to testify
against the one on trial. Only sentimentality can be marshalled in
support of this privilege to hide the knowledge of the spouse, and
most of the great authorities on evidence including Jeremy Bentham,
Edward Livingston, and John H. Wigmore have condemned it.7 The
arguments for its abolition were presented with force and moderation
as long ago as 1853 in the following passage8 from the Report of
the English Commissioners of Common Law Procedure:
"A more difficult question (than that of admitting them in each
other's favor) arises when we proceed to consider whether it should
be made competent to an adverse party to call a husband or wife as
witness against one another. The case would no doubt be of rare oc-
currence; when it did, it would in the greater number of instances be
where husband and wife have separated and are on bad terms with
one another. In such cases the mischief apprehended from the inter-
ruption of domestic happiness becomes out of the question. But sup-
pose the husband and wife living together on the usual terms; here
the identity of interest between them will deter an adverse party
from calling one against the other, except under very peculiar and
pressing circumstances and when the fact to be proved is certain in
its character and clearly within the knowledge of the witness. . ..
But if there be such a fact in the knowledge of one of two married
persons, so material to the cause of the adverse party as to make it
worth his while to run the risk of calling so hostile a witness, it be-
'4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §2228
' Quoted in WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7.
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comes matter of very serious consideration whether justice should
be allowed to be defeated by the exclusion of such evidence. It is
clear that nothing but an amount of mischief outbalancing the evil
of defeated justice can warrant the exclusion of testimony necessary
to justice. What, then, is the mischief here to be apprehended? The
possibility of resentment of a husband against a wife for testifying
to facts prejudicial to his interest. But it is obvious that such resent-
ment could only be felt by persons prepared to commit perjury them-
selves and to expect it to be committed in their behalf. Such in-
stances, we believe, would be very rare; and we do not think that a
regard to the feelings of individuals of this class, or the amount of
mischief likely to arise from a disregard of them, is sufficient to
compensate for the loss which in many cases may result from the
exclusion of the evidence. . . . The conclusion to which the fore-
going observation leads us is that husband and wife should be com-
petent and compellable to given evidence for and against one another
on matters of fact as to which either could now be examined as a
party in the cause."
It is recommended that N. C. Code (1927) §§1801 and 1802 be
amended so as to read as follows:
"11801. In any criminal prosecution or in any civil action or proceeding the
husband or wife of any party shall be competent and compellable to testify as
a witness for or against such party.
1802. No husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confidential
communication made by one to the other during their marriage."
Impeaching One's Own Witness.
Anothei hoary antiquity which has survived in the present day
rules of evidence as a relic of an earlier age is the rule that a party
may not impeach his own witness. Apparently, as Wigmore sug-
gests,9 it may have had its origin in the days when witnesses were
called not to testify to the facts in dispute, but merely to give an
oath in support of the party as a sort of ceremonial. Not on the
facts but on the correctness of the compliance by each party and his
witnesses with this oath-ceremonial, was the case decided. These
"oath-helpers" naturally were selected from the friends and adherents
of the party who called them. When in a later stage of evolution
witnesses had become portrayers of the facts, the feeling that they
were to be classed as clansmen or supporters of the party who called
'2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §§896-918. The arguments advanced in this
paragraph are all derived from this author.
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them, still lingered. Hence it was natural to view any attack from
this party against the witness as a sort of treachery, or a blowing
hot and cold. Later the matter was rationalized by the theory that
a party by placing a witness on the stand to testify to a fact vouches
for his character and credibility. It is also asserted that a party
should not be able to coerce a witness by threatening to blacken his
character if he should fail to testify as desired. Neither of these
reasons would support the rule, however, so far as it forbids the
party to show that the witness has made a statement before the trial
inconsistent with his present evidence. This is the sort of impeach-
ment that a party is most likely to have occasion to use against his
own witness. It is to be remembered that a party must often prove
his facts through hostile witnesses. It is not the party who selects
the witness, but fate that determines who has, for example, actually
observed a collision or seen a murder, 10 or heard the defamatory
utterances. If such a one be unreliable he must, nevertheless, be
called for what he knows. The party who calls him is placed in an
undeservedly bad light and the true facts are likely to be obscured,
if this party, when surprised as the witness suddenly changes his
story, cannot place before the jury the witness's earlier and quite
possibly more truthful statement. This would seem to be permitted
by one of our decisions. 1 Likewise, facts showing the hostile ani-
mus or adverse interest of a witness toward the party calling him
are not seriously derogatory to the witness but are invaluable in
assessing the truth of his evidence as a whole. If the only surviving
eye-witness of a collision is the defendant's cousin, the plaintiff may
be forced to call him, but surely he should be allowed to discount
the adverse part of his testimony by showing the kinship, while in-
sisting upon the truth of the favorable facts wrung from the unwill-
ing witness. Whatever little there may be of value in the rule against
impeaching one's own witness may be preserved by limiting the pro-
hibition to attacks upon his character or reputation. Many states
have endeavored to modernize their law in regard to this matter.
12
A statute in the following form is suggested:
"' State v. Melvin, 194 N. C. 394, 139 S. E. 762 (1927) (the state was forced
to call the sole eye-witness of a homicide and sought to impeach her evidence).
"Smith, Administrator v. The Atlantic and Charlotte Air Line R. R. Co.,
147 N. C. 603, 608, 61 S. E. 575, 577 (1908) (dictum). Contra: State v. Tay-
lor, 88 N. C. 694 (1883) ; State v. Melvin, supra note 10, 396.
'Among the states are Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. Their statutes are cited
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"The fact that a witness has been called by one party to a cause, civil or
criminal, shall not preclude the party so calling him from proving, by the said
witness himself or by other witnesses, that the said witness has made state-
ments inconsistent in a material respect with his testimony, or that facts exist
which tend to show bias, interest, or corruption in regard to the case on trial,
on the part of such witness. No party, however, may for the purpose of im-
peaching his testimony, inquire into the character, or reputation, of a witness
who has been called by such party at any stage of the cause or proceedings.'
Admissibility of Book-Entries.
In the trial of cases involving business transactions it frequently
becomes necessary to prove that certain routine business operations
have taken place, and the proof must often be made long after the de-
tails have passed from the memory of the persons who carried out
these operations. Thus, for example, it may be necessary to show that
certain goods were delivered to a carrier or to a purchaser, or that a
cash advance has been made to an employee, or that money has been
paid out by a trust company as part of the expenses of managing an
estate. It is universally customary in all commercial enterprises to
make careful, written, day-to-day records of all such transactions,
and when the facts are sought, these records are accepted prima facie
among business men as truly reflecting those facts. Money and
property in huge amounts change hands every day upon the faith of
such records. In the courtroom when business transactions become
the subject of controversy it would naturally be anticipated that such
records would readily be received for what they are worth as evi-
dence of the matters recorded, subject of course to be rebutted by
any evidence in contradiction. The courts, however, have been ham-
pered in adjusting their procedure to modern business practice in
this respect by rules designed to furnish safeguards against casual
hear-say but inappropriate as applied to these regularly kept records
of the business world. Among the common law restrictions upon the
use of business records the one which raises the most serious prac-
and summarized in 2 WIGMORF, EVIDENCE (1923) §906, note 3. The Virginia
act, Code (1919) §6215, is as follows: "A party producing a witness shall not
be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character, but he
may, in case the witness shall in the opinion of the court prove adverse, by
leave of the court, prove that he has made at other times a statement incon-
sistent with his present testimony, but before said last mentioned proof can
be given the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate
the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be
asked whether or not he has made such statement. In every such case the
court, if requested by either party, shall instruct the jury not to consider the
evidence of such inconsistent statements, except for the purpose of contra-
dicting the witness."
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tical difficulties is this: The person who made the particular entries
in the book which show the payment, the receipt of the goods, or
whatever fact is in question, must be identified and must either be
brought into court as a witness to the correctness of the entry or
someone must be produced who will swear that this person is dead,
out of the state, or otherwise impossible to produce in court as a
witness. 13 This requirement sounds reasonable but in fact it is re-
pugnant to common sense. Today the system of records of a business
of any size, a bank, for instance, is a co6perative affair. Many clerks
and bookkeepers participate in making the entries. Oftentimes the
records are typewritten and then there is no handwriting clue to
make it possible to identify the particular person who made the entry.
Furthermore, if by chance identification is possible, usually several
clerks would have to be called to verify the various entries which
trace the progress of the transaction through its various stages. For
example, in case of a dispute as to the shipment and delivery of
goods sold, it might be necessary to call shipping clerks, draymen,
way-bill clerks, delivery clerks and many others, to authenticate the
entries which tell the story of the progress of the shipment from
factory to destination. The direct expense of producing these wit-
nesses is often very heavy and may frequently exceed the amount of
the claim itself. The indirect expense due to the interruption of
business by calling away these clerks from their work to attend court
makes business men groan. .Furthermore, if this trouble and expense
is incurred and the witnesses produced, it is at once apparent, in nine
cases out of ten, that it was not worth the trouble, as respects giving
the jury any thing that the books themselves, unaided, would not have
given. The majority of such witnesses turn out to have no recol-
lection of the facts recorded in the books but are able only to identify
the entries as their own and to swear that they must be correct else
the witness would not have made them. Before such a blank wall
cross-examination is usually helpless. The game is not worth the
candle. Obviously, the sensible solution is to require merely that
"The rules as to the admissibility of business entries are fully discussed in
3 WmOEom, EVIDENCE (1923) §§1517-1615. They are summarized in THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM by EDMUND M. MORGAN and
the other members of a committee acting for the Commonwealth Fund, a book-
let which should be in the hands of every one who is interested in the improve-
ment of trial procedure. Extended criticism of the functioning of these rules
under modern business conditions is to be found in both of the works referred
to, and they are the sources of the suggestions and ideas presented herein by
the present writer.
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some witness, such as an office manager or supervising bookkeeper,
be produced who is familiar from first-hand knowledge with the
books and records relied on, and who can identify them, and can
testify that in general they were correctly kept. The need for a closer
assimilation of court procedure to business practice in this respect
was recognized by our Supreme Court in what has been described as
"one of the best modern opinions" on this subject,' 4 and an important
step was taken in that direction by the decision. In the case referred
to, the court held admissible the record of arrival and departure of
trains kept by the train dispatcher and based, not upon his personal
knowledge, but upon telegraphic reports of station agents though the
record was authenticated by the production of the dispatcher only,
without the station agents who made the reports. It carries us, how-
ever, only one step toward the goal. It dispenses with the production
of the subordinates who made the reports upon which the records
offered in evidence were based, and this is helpful. It does not, how-
ever, touch the question which arises when it is sought to dispense
with the persons who actually made15 each of the entries in a series
of business records offered in evidence-persons whom it may be
difficult and expensive to identify and produce. A recent decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit' 6 considered that
question and adopted the view that in cases where, in the trial judge's
discretion it is found necessary to do so, and where there is sufficient
circumstantial guaranty of the trustworthiness of the records, "it
should be sufficient if the books are verified on the stand by the super-
vising officer who knew them to be the books of regular entries kept
in that establishment; thus the production on the stand of a regiment
of bookkeepers, salesmen, shipping clerks, teamsters, foremen or
other subordinate employees, should be dispensed with." 1 7
Even this enlightened holding still leaves the lawyer who is pre-
paring a case for trial in doubt whether, after he announces ready,
the trial judge in his discretion will admit the books without pro-
"4The opinion of Connor, J., in Firemens' Insurance Co. v. Seaboard Air
Line R. R. Co., 138 N. C. 42, 50 S. E. 452 (1905) was so characterized in 3
WIGmoRE, EViDENCE (1923) §1530, and this comment is approved in the opinion
of Clarkson, J., in Ft. Worth & D. C. R. R. Co. v. Hegwood, 198 N. C. 309,
316 (1930).
See Jones v. A. L. L. Ry. Co., 148 N. C. 449, 62 S. E. 521 (1908).
"E. J. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Tomlinson, 296 Fed. 634 (C. C. A. 4th,
1924).1"Quoted by the court from 3 WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE (1923) §1530. The court
also cited 4 CHAMBERLAYNF, EVIDENcE (1913) §§2881, 2884, 2886, and 2887.
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ducing all the subordinates who participated in gathering the facts
and recording them. The lawyer will, therefore, only feel safe if he
goes to the trouble and expense to have these people available.
Still other obstacles confront him who would use business records
in court in North Carolina. If the plaintiff seeks to use his own
books as evidence to support an action for a sizeable debt, he may
be faced with the argument that our archaic "book-debt" statute' 8
adopted in 1756 at a time when parties were incompetent as wit-
nesses, and permitting the use of a party's own books to support his
claim on an account not to exceed sixty dollars, would impliedly for-
bid their use where the claim exceeds that amount. Likewise, where
either party, plaintiff or defendant, in any case not covered by the
"book-debt" statute, offers his own books, the vague doctrine an-
nounced by some of our decisions against the use of such book-
entries when they are "self-serving" 10 may block his path.
It is true that the situation is much alleviated by the "verified
account" statute20 which makes a sworn account prima facic evi-
dence for the plaintiff in actions for goods sold, services rendered,
and money loaned on oral contract, but even here plaintiff must be
prepared to show that the person who verified the account had per-
sonal knowledge21 of all the details of the transaction, such as the
delivery of each item sold-not an easy condition to comply with in
an account of any complexity-and furthermore, it has application
only to certain actions for debt, and leaves untouched the frequent
occasions for the use of book-entries in other types of cases, for ex-
ample, freight claims against railways, and actions upon construction
contracts.
In 1927 a statute designed to secure the admission in court of
business records in a practical and common sense way was drafted
by a committee of distinguished authorities on the law of evidence
which included in its membership Professors J. H. Wigmore and
N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927) §§1786, 1787, 1788.
Durham Dyeing Co. v. Hosiery Co., 126 N. C. 292, 35 S. E. 586 (1900);
Peele v. Powell, 156 N. C. 553, 73 S. E. 234 (1911); see Branch v. Ayscue,
186 N. C. 219, 119 S. E. 201 (1923).
'ON. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §1789.
Nail v. Kelly, 169 N. C. 717, 86 S. E. 627 (1915) ; but the authority of
the expressions in that opinion requiring that the affiant have personal knowl-
edge are weakened by'the more liberal intimations in the recent opinion by
Brogden, J., in Endicott-Johnson Corporation v. Schachet, 198 N. C. 769 (1930)
in which he suggests that it is sufficient if the affiant be a person "who would
be a competent witness if called at the trial to testify with respect to the
transaction."
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E. M. Morgan, Chief Justice Johnston of the Supreme Court of
Kansas, and the late Judge Charles M. Hough of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals.22 This statute was adopted in New York
23
in 1928 and it is recommended that the present obsolete "book-debt"
statute (N. C. Code, §§1786, 1787, 1788) be repealed and this be
substituted. It reads as follows:
"Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence
or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction, oc-
currence or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the regular
course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such business to
make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occur-
rence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances
of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge
by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not
affect its admissibility. The term business shall include business, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind."
Religious Belief of Witness.
Under "Notes and Comments," p. 77, there is a discussion en-
titled "Impeaching Witness by Showing Religious Belief." The
following statute is there proposed:
"No witness shall be questioned in any judicial proceeding concerning his
religious belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject for the
purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility."
24
The adoption of this statute is especially desirable in view of the
compelling arguments in the above-mentioned comment.
MOTOR VEHICLES
Liability for Injuries to Guest.
The Uniform Act Regulating the Operation of Motor Vehicles
on Highways1 should be amended by adding a new section as follows:
" The report of the committee is published by the Yale University Press
under the title THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM. See
note 13, supra. The proposed statute is set out at p. 63 of the report.
" NEW YORK LAWS 1928, c. 532 (Civil Practice Act, §374 a). It was re-
cently construed in the interesting case of Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N. Y. 124, 170
N. E. 517 (1930) not to authorize the admission of a report of a street collision
by a policeman who came up after the accident where it was based upon hear-
say statements of persons present at the scene.
"This is the language of Pa. Stat. (West, 1920) §21834.1 N. C. PUB. LAws (1927) c. 148.
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I 'No person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action
for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case
of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence
or wilful or wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of suchj motor
vehicle.' '2
The liability of the driver or owner of an automobile to a gratu-
itous guest is discussed elsewhere in this issue.8 Courts and legis-
latures have begun to place limitations upon the guest's right of ac-
tion. The evils to be corrected and the objects to be gained by such
limitations are not definitely stated, but there is a feeling that it is
unjust to permit casual guests or licensees to recover large sums for
injuries resulting from negligent operation of automobiles in which
they are riding. Likewise there has undoubtedly been an increase of
vexatious litigation in this class of cases and of collusive suits to
recover under the owner's insurance.
In Oregon, a statute which attempted to go all the way and de-
prive a gratuitous guest of a right of action in all cases, even for
gross negligence or intentional injury, was held invalid.4 In Massa-
chusetts and Georgia, the courts have handled the situation without
the assistance of legislation by holding that an owner or driver is
only liable to a guest for gross negligence.5 In at least three states-
Connecticut, 6 Michigan 7 and Iowa8-statutes have been passed to
the same effect, taking away the guest's right of action in cases of
ordinary negligence in the operation of the car, but leaving a right
of action where the driver's conduct is wilful or grossly negligent.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the Connecticut
statute on the grounds that there is a reasonable basis for classifying
gratuitous guests from paying passengers and guests in automobiles
from guests in other vehicles.9 One objection to such a statute is
that it decreases the public liability of the insurer and there seems to
be no reason why insurance companies should be so favored without
requiring a corresponding reduction of rates. Yet the large number
'This language is taken from the Michigan statute, MicH. Pun. AcTs
(1929) No. 19.
'Page 98.
'Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998 (1928).
Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917) ; Epps v. Par-
rish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S. E. 297 (1923).
6 CONN. Pus. AcTs (1927) c. 308.
'MIcH. Pus. AcTs (1929) No. 19.
'CODE OF IOWA (1927) §5026-bl.
'Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct. 57, 74 L. ed. 67 (1929).
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of cases in which no insurance is carried and the possibility that in-
surance companies may adjust their rates accordingly make the
adoption of the statute seem advisable.
PROPERTY
Estate by Entirety
In the law of North Carolina there still exists the estate by the
entirety, which possesses the same properties and incidents it did as
at common law.' According to Blackstone: "If an estate in fee be
given to a man and his wife, they are neither properly joint tenants
nor tenants in common; for husband and wife being considered one
person in law they cannot take the estate by moieties; but both are
seized of the entirety, per tout.et non per my; the consequence of
which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any
part without the assent of the other, but the whole must remain in the
survivor.
' 2
The Supreme Court has held that the act of 1784, now N. C. Code
(1927) §1735, abolishing survivorship in joint tenancies does not
apply to estates by the entirety ;3 the reason being that husband and
wife do not hold an estate in joint tenancy but hold in unity.4 It also
has been held in several well considered decisions of the Supreme
Court that our constitution and the later statutes relative to the prop-
erty and rights of married women have not thus far destroyed or
altered the nature of this estate.5 However, in Turlington v. Lucas6
it was held that Article X, §6 of the North Carolina Constitution
makes tenancy by the entirety in personalty impossible, since it
changes the common law rule that the wife's personalty belongs to
her husband and gives her a separate estate.
While an estate by the entirety seems desirable from the stand-
point that it may afford a means of keeping intact an accumulation of
real property in the hands of a husband and wife in moderate financial
circumstances, and, by the incident of survivorship, precludes the
necessity of either party making a will; yet it is submitted that other
The properties and incidents of estates by the entirety have been admirably
summarized by Chief Justice Stacy in Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 124 S. E.
566 (1924) and in Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490 (1924).
'2 Blk., * 182.
'Phillips v. Hodges, 109 N. C. 248, 13 S. E. 769 (1891).
'Gray v. Bailey, 117 N. C. 439, 23 S. E. 318 (1895).
'Long v. Barnes, 87 N. C. 329 (1882) ; McKinnon v. Calk, 167 N. C. 411, 83
S. E. 559 (1914) and cases therein cited.6186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
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considerations of importance suggest the advisability of the legisla-
ture abolishing by statute the estate and turning it into a tenancy in
common.
Chief Justice Clark said: "This estate by entirety is an anomaly
and it is perhaps an oversight that the legislature has not changed it
into a cotenancy as has been done in so many states."7
Not only is this estate an anomaly in our judicial system but it also
seems foreign to our present-day policy in regard to the property
rights of married women as voiced by our constitution and statutes.
While in theory the estate is held by husband and wife as one person,
yet so far as the beneficial enjoyment of the property is concerned, the
husband is the one. Under the old common law principle which vests
in the husband, jure uxoris, the rents and profits of his wife's lands
during coverture, the husband, in an estate by the entirety, is en-
titled to the possession, income, increase or usufruct of all the prop-
erty during their joint lives; and a lease of the land -by the husband
alone, without the wife's joinder, is valid during coverture.8 Long
ago a similar right of the husband to the usufruct of his wife's lands,
either by virtue of the marital right or of the tenancy by the curtesy
initiate, was reduced by Article X, §6 of the Constitution and
C. S. 2510 to a bare right of occupancy with his wife, together with
the right of ingress and egress.9 Thus we see that by the retention
of the estate by the entireties in our system of jurisprudence one of
its common law incidents is carried over to the unfair advantage of
the husband. It might also be further mentioned that the wife can-
not by partition proceedings get any portion of the estate for her sole
and separate use.' 0
Neither the husband nor the wife can convey the estate or dispose
of his or her interest or any part thereof without the assent of the
other; nor is it subject to the lien of a docketed judgment or to be
taken for the debt of either party without the assent of the other. 1
That is to say, that while a judgment rendered against the husband
and wife jointly, upon a joint obligation, may be satisfied out of an
estate in lands held by them as tenants by the entirety ;12 yet on lands
held by such an estate there is conferred an absolute exemption and
Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N. C. 95, 53 S. E. 478 (1906).
8 Greenville v. Gornto, 161 N. C. 341, 77 S. E. 222 (1913) ;, Davis v. Bass,
188 N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924).
'Walker v. Long, 109 N. C. 510, 14 S. E. 299 (1891).
"Jones v. Smith and Co., 149 N. C. 318, 62 S. E. 1092 (1908).
Gray v. Bailey, supra note 4.
Martin v. Lewis, 187 N. C. 473, 122 S. E. 180 (1924).
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immunity from lien and sale upon a judgment against either husband
or wife at least during their joint lives. As Judge Clark tersely ex-
pressed it: "An estate by entireties is a haven for a debtor who would
by this device exempt property from liability for any debt, either of
himself or of his wife."
13
It seems desirable that this estate with its antiquated common law
properties and incidents should be, by statutory enactment, relegated
to the scrap heap of the past. On numerous occasions our Supreme
Court has suggested that the estate be abolished by the legislature and
changed into a tenancy in common.14 For the consideration of the
legislature we propose a statute similar in form to the following:
"ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY ABOLISHED. A conveyance or devise
of land or of any interest therein to husband and wife, except a mortgage to
them, or a devise or a conveyance to them as trustees, shall create an estate in
them as tenants in common and not as tenants by the entirety unless it is ex-
pressly stated in said conveyance or devise that the grantees or devisees shall
take to them and the survivor of them; Provided, however, that this Act shall
not apply when husband and wife acquire land as partners in business in which
case their interests in said land shall be subject to and governed by the pro-
visions of section one thousand seven hundred and thirty-five (§1735) of the
Consolidated Statutes of North Carolina: and Provided, further, that this Act
shall not apply to any estate by the entirety which shall vest prior to January
1, 1932."
Rule in Shelley's Case.
It is with some temerity that we make bold to suggest the abolition
by legislative fiat of the venerable Rule in Shelley's Case-that
"Gothic column found among the remains of feudality." The legal
principles upon which the rule is based are traced by Blackstone back
to a case decided in the 18th year of the reign of Edward II, A. D.
1325; while Shelley's Case from which the rule takes its name was
decided in 1581.
The Rule in Shelley's Case is fully recognized in North Carolina,
and where the same properly applies it prevails as a rule of property,
both in deeds and wills.' A good definition of the rule is as follows:
That when the ancestor by any gift or conveyance taketh an estate
of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited
"Martin v. Lewis, supra note 12." West v. Railroad, 140 N. C. 620, 53 S. E. 477 (1906) ; Hood v. Mercer,
150 N. C. 699, 64 S. E. 897 (1909) ; Jones v. Smith and Co., 149 N. C. 318, 62
S. E. 1092 (1908) ; Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
'Fillyaw v. Van Lear, 188 N. C. 772, 125 S. E. 544 (1924).
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either mediately or immediately to his heirs, in fee or in tail, the word
"heirs" is a word of limitation of the estate and not a word of
purchase. The courts seem to agree in the general statement that it is
a rule of law and not of construction; that is, if the words "heirs" or
"heirs of the body" are used with no explanation, with no stperadded
words which to a certainty show that other persons or individuals are
meant than the heirs general of the first taker, the rule must apply
inexorably as one of law, and the intention of the grantor or devisor
is not to be considered.2
However punctilious the lip-service the Supreme Court of North
Carolina may render to the Rule as a rule of law, yet on many occa-
sions we find the court striving to give effect to the actual intent of
the testator or grantor regardless of the technical language used.
Judge Douglas said: "The Rule in Shelley's Case is purely a technical
rule and, being contrary to the general spirit of the law, inasmuch as
it tends to defeat the intention of the testator, should be strictly con-
strued. The words 'heirs of the body' are held to be words of limita-
tions unless there be some clause or restriction added, whereby it
plainly appears that the words 'heirs of the body' are intended as
words of purchase. This qualified deference to the intention of the
testator is shown in numberless cases throughout the books."8 This
deference to the intention of the grantor or testator has also been
shown in some recent cases.4
It is submitted that the legislature should, -by definitely abolishing
the Rule in Shelley's Case, permit the court to construe the instru-
ment in which the fatal formula-"To A for life, remainder to his
heirs"-has been used, so as to give full effect to the actual intention
of the maker of the instrument. To quote Judge Douglas again:
"Every rule of construction, save one, is properly invoked to carry
out the evident intention of the grantor. . . .This single exception is
the Rule in Shelley's Case, the Don Quixote of the law, which like
the last knight errant of chivalry has long survived every cause that
gave it birth and now wanders aimlessly through the reports, still
vigorous, but equally useless and dangerous."
'Nichols v. Gladden, 117 N. C. 497, 23 S. E. 459 (1895).
'Hooker v. Montague, 123 N. C. 154, 31 S. E. 705 (1898) and cases therein
cited.
'Shephard v. Horton, 188 N. C. 787, 125 S. E. 539 (1924) ; Fillyaw v. Van
Lear, 188 N. C. 772, 125 S. E. 544 (1924) ; Hampton v. Griggs, 184 N. C. 13,
113 S. E. 501 (1922).
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A number of states have, either by express statute or by judicial
decision, repudiated the Rule.5 New York, one of the most pro-
gressive of states in matters of real property legislation, abolished
the Rule in 1830. It is suggested that North Carolina use as a model
for its legislation in this matter the New York Statute:
"Rule in Shelley's Case abolished. Where a remainder shall be limited
to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of a person to whom a life estate in the same
premises is given, the persons who, on the termination of the life estate, are the
heirs or heirs of the body of such tenant for life, shall take as purchasers, by
virtue of the remainder so limited to them;6 Provided, that this act shall not
apply to any estate which shall vest prior to January 1, 1932."1
TRUSTS
A Statute of Frauds.
The following new statute is suggested:
"No express trust in land or personalty shall be enforced unless the ex-
istence and terms of the trust shall have been proved by a written instrument
or memorandum signed by the person creating or declaring the trust or by the
person to be charged as trustee or by the agent of either of them thereunto law-
fully authorized. Nothing in this act, however, shall operate to deprive any
court of the power to prevent the unjust enrichment of any person at the ex-
pense of another by the establishment of a constructive trust in cases where
the property in question has either been obtained or is sought to be kept
through deceit, undue influence, breach of a fiduciary obligation or of a confi-
dential relationship, or through breach of a contract whether made in writing
or not. Provided, however, that no constructive trust in connection with a
will shall redound to the benefit of any person other than the person or persons
who would have taken the property had no such testamentary disposition been
made, unless the devisee or legatee has fraudulently thwarted an intended
disposition by will directly to such other person. Nor shall anything in this
act operate to deprive any court of the power to declare that a resulting trust
has arisen from any implication of fact or by operation of law."
The law in North Carolina with reference to parol trusts has been
stated in an article in the N. C. LAW REVIEW. 1 One case has arisen
since the publication of that article,2 in which the Court raised a con-
structive trust to prevent the unjust enrichment of an agent at the
expense of his principal. North Carolina has never adopted a Statute
'For the status of the rule in the various states, see note in 29 L. R. A.
(n.s.) 1158 (1911).
' Cahill's Cons. Laws of New York (1923) ch. 51, §54.
'Lord and Van Hecke (1930), Parol Trusts in North Carolina, 8 N. C. L.
REv. 152.
'Sorrell v. Sorrell, 198 N. C. 460 (1930).
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of Frauds relating to trusts. To supply that defect, the courts have
resorted to the parol evidence rule, to the contract Statute of Fraudsa
and to an originally irrelevant modification of the Wills Act. 4 The
statute above suggested is intended to establish a Statute of Frauds
relating to trusts. It is believed that its enactment will clarify the
whole situation and prevent further repetition of the already excessive
litigation in this field.
As a comparison of its provisions with the article mentioned will
disclose, the proposed statute would change the effect of the decided
cases only in two particulars. One is to require a writing in express
trusts of personal property. When the English Statute of Frauds
was enacted, and when the first American statutes of that character
were first adopted, land was the chief subject matter of trusts. To-
day, personal property, and particularly intangibles such as stocks and
bonds and other forms of credits figure largely in the trust trans-
actions. It is believed, therefore, that a new statute should at this
day cover both realty and personalty.
The other change is to authorize a constructive trust to prevent
the unjust enrichment of one who obtained the property by means of
an unwritten contract which he perhaps at the time intended to per-
form but which he has subsequently breached. The weight of Amer-
ican authority allows the grantee in such a situation to keep the prop-
erty, feeling that to hold otherwise would be to violate the statute of
frauds which, in most states, only exempts from its operation "trusts
created by operation of law" or "constructive trusts." A minority of
the American decisions, however, together with the English cases, en-
force a constructive trust here by construing the exception noted as
permitting constructive trusts whenever it would be dishonest or un-
just for the grantee to keep the property and by permitting proof of
the contract as evidence that the grantee knew the property was not
to be his own and that he gave nothing for it save the promise made
orally to hold it on trust. To the objection that this amounts to a
destruction of the policy of the Statute of Frauds, these English and
minority American courts reply that the doctrine applies only where
the breach of contract is coupled with an attempt thus to retain prop-
erty and that it does not apply to ordinary commercial contracts.
North Carolina agrees with the minority on the A to B for C situa-
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §988.
'Ibid., §4136.
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tion, but with the majority on the A to B for A situation.5 But in the
case of A turning property over to B on an oral trust for A, it is a
mere accidental coincidence that the restoration of the status quo
parallels the enforcement of the express oral trust. Most American
and English courts spell a constructive trust out of a mere breach of
contract when that contract was made with one thus disposing of his
property in lieu of a testamentary disposition.
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTs ACT
Amendments to Uniform Act.
In 1917 North Carolina adopted the Uniform Warehouse Re-
ceipts Act.' Since that time the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws has made three important amendments 2 to
the Uniform Act. These amendments were made in August, 1922;
and so far, have not been incorporated by our legislature into the
Act of 1917. Thus North Carolina is left at present with what was
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. It is recommended that the
legislature bring the law up to date by adopting the changes made
in the Uniform Act by the Commissioners.
The first of the three amendments involved a change in the first
full sentence of §20 of the Uniform Act, now §4060 of the North
Carolina Consolidated Statutes. Leaving intact the balance of the
section, the first full sentence thereof as amended (amendment in
bold face type) would read as follows:
"FAILURE TO DELIVER GOODS AS DESCRIBED. A warehouseman
shall be liable to the holder of a receipt, issued by him or on his behalf by an
agent or employee the scope of whose actual or apparent authority includes the
issuing of warehouse receipts, for damages caused by the non-existence of the
goods or by the failure of the goods to correspond with the description thereof
in the receipt at the time of its issue."
Thus the section as amended makes more specific, than did the
old section, the type of receipt under which the warehouseman may
incur liability to the holder thereof.
The second amendment adopted by the Commissioners repealed
old §40 of the Uniform Act and substituted therefor a new §40,
which, if adopted by our legislature, would take the place of C. S.
'Note 1, supro and see Scott, Conveyances upon Trusts Improperly Declared
(1924), 37 HARV. L. REv. 653.1 N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§4036-4095.
'For these amendments see 3 U. L. A. ANN. (Supp., 1929), pp. 13, 31, 35.
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4080 which corresponds with the former §40 of the Uniform Act.
The amendment is as follows:
"WHO MAY NEGOTIATE A RECEIPT. A negotiable receipt may be
negotiated by any person in possession of the same however such possession
may have been acquired, if, by the terms of the receipt, the warehouseman
undertakes to deliver the goods to the order of such person or if at the time of
negotiation the receipt is in such form that it may be negotiated by delivery."
An examination of the present §4080 of the Consolidated Statutes
will reveal the fact that one who takes by trespass or as a finder is
not included within the description of those who may negotiate a
warehouse receipt. The proposed amendment would give full nego-
tiability to warehouse receipts as already obtains in the case of bills
of lading under the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, §31.3 On the
basis of further facilitating commercial transactions under modern
conditions, it is reasonable to assume that warehouse receipts should
be given the same degree of negotiability as bills of lading.
The third amendment adopted by the Commissioners changed the
wording of §47 of the Uniform Act-which merely elaborated for
the sake of clearness certain cases within the terms of old §40-to
make §47 consistent with and perform the same function with refer-
ence to the new §40 as changed by the amendment just discussed. If
this third amendment should be adopted by the North Carolina leg-
islature, §4087 of the Consolidated Statutes would read as follows
to conform to amended §47 of the Uniform Act:
" IWHEN NEGOTIATION NOT IMPAIRED BY FRAUD, MISTAKE OR
DURESS. The validity of the negotiation of a receipt is not impaired by the
fact that such negotiation was a breach of duty on the part of the person
making the negotiation, or by the fact that the owner of the receipt was de-
prived of the possession of the same by loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistake,
duress, or conversion, if the person to whom the receipt was negotiated or the
person to whom the receipt was subsequently negotiated, paid value therefor,
in good faith, without notice of the breach of duty, or loss, theft, fraud, acci-
dent, mistake, duress or conversion." (Amendment indicated by bold face
portions.)
Since the three amendments herein discussed were adopted in
1922 by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws, nine states4 have in-
corporated them into their uniform warehouse receipts acts.
I This uniform act was adopted in North Carolina in 1919, N. C. ANN CoDE.
(Michie, 1927), §§280-323. Section 312 of our Bills of Lading Act is identical
in wording with the proposed amendment except for the name of the instrument
involved.
'California, Colorado, Vermont, New York, Idaho, Ohio, Wisconsin,
Nevada, and Utah.
